South Korean hostage crisis in Afghanistan, a case of many firsts: Stratfor

The crisis created by the kidnapping of 23 South Korean hostages may have ended last week, but according to STRATFOR, the incident is a case of many firsts.

Washington, Sept.6 : The crisis created by the kidnapping of 23 South Korean hostages may have ended last week, but according to STRATFOR, the incident is a case of many firsts.

The incident started off with neither side - the Taliban on one side, and the South Korean and Afghan Governments on the other - refusing to come to an understanding on how to end the standoff.

But as deadline after deadline passed, a STRATFOR article suggests that there was a wilting on negotiating positions.

The Afghan Government rejected a demand for a prisoner exchange release due to the overwhelmingly negative reaction it had received after bowing to Italian pressure to release captives in the Mastrogiacomo case.

The South Koreans did "agree" to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, and reportedly decided to do this before the kidnapping. They also decided to end all their missionary work in Afghanistan, and significantly a ransom appears to have been paid as part of the final deal.

According to STRATFOR, the paying of a ransom is fairly standard practice in kidnapping cases, while the agreement to pull out troops already scheduled for withdrawal echoes a 2004 deal between the Philippine government and hostage-takers in Iraq.

However, it says that the agreement to end missionary aid work in Afghanistan has set a precedent that could have repercussions going beyond the Hindu Kush.

This case, the private intelligence-gathering network says is notable because it marks the first time the Taliban grabbed such a large group of foreign hostages.

The case also reveals that the Taliban does not operate under one military leader and that there is no consistent track record on how they treat their hostages.

Some kidnapping groups kill their victims outright, while others seek ransom deals.

This case also is noteworthy because shortly after the kidnapping, the South Korean government entered into direct negotiations with the Taliban. sovereign state negotiating with an insurgent group as its equal gives that insurgent group a cachet of power.

Despite the initial confusion, the South Koreans eventually were able to open a direct channel with the proper Taliban leaders. Given that that they had such a large pool of foreign hostages and a direct channel to the South Korean government -- not to mention their favorable deal in the Mastrogiacomo kidnapping -- the Taliban must have considered their negotiating position quite strong at the beginning of the process. As the scenario unfolded, however, their hand began to weaken.

It came out clearly that Seoul's clout in Kabul is not on par with that of the Italians.

The kidnappers were able to save face in part, then, when Seoul pledged to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2007.

South Korea, which has about 200 troops performing non-combat missions in Afghanistan, already had scheduled a complete withdrawal by the end of the year, so the pledge did not cost it either in practical or tactical terms.

The deal, however, did set a precedent for Afghanistan similar to the one set in Iraq in 2004, when the Philippine government agreed to withdraw its troops, who already were scheduled for withdrawal, as part of a deal in a kidnapping case.

The South Korean government's pledge to discontinue all missionary activities in Afghanistan by the end of the year also allowed the kidnappers to extract themselves gracefully from the case. Moreover, South Korea's missionary groups agreed to the condition.

The Taliban probably received some ransom; reports placed the payment at 20 million dollars, an amount that could fetch them a lot of weapons to use against Afghan and NATO forces.

The Taliban believe Afghanistan's many foreign missionary and secular humanitarian aid organizations support the Afghan Government. Therefore, they will consider the South Korean ban on missionary activity in Afghanistan as a blow to the Hamid Karzai regime.

History has shown that the actions of jihadists in one part of the world are carefully watched by jihadists elsewhere, and tactics that prove successful spread rapidly, claims the STRAFOR report.

This case has sent a signal to jihadists and other militant Islamist operatives in other countries that this wide network of South Korean missionaries is a desirable target. And this target set can easily be expanded to include other foreign missionaries, the report concludes.

ANI