AQ Khan network, a private subsidiary dedicated to Pak

The nuclear proliferation network of disgraced scientist Dr AQ Khan was a privatised subsidiary of a larger state-based network dedicated to Pakistani nuclear programme, and would be much better characterised as an imports-exports enterprise, an analyst has said.

Washington, Aug 22 : The nuclear proliferation network of disgraced scientist Dr AQ Khan was a privatised subsidiary of a larger state-based network dedicated to Pakistani nuclear programme, and would be much better characterised as an "imports-exports enterprise," an analyst has said.

Bruno Tertrias, writing in Strategic Studies, a journal produced by the Centre for Contemporary Conflict in Monterey, California, points out that Pakistan originally developed its nuclear complex out in the open through major state-approved contracts.

Tertrias claims that after India's 1974 nuclear explosion in Rajasthan deserts, Western countries became more cautious about their nuclear exports to Pakistan. This convinced Islamabad to launch a second, secret nuclear programme in the mid-1970s. The launching of this programme saw the beginning of a massive campaign to import from the West.

The imports network also sought many elements for a plutonium programme, as well as components for nuclear weapons. It included nuclear materials and metals, and ranged from full-scale installations to sub-components.

Tertrias says that at the same time, Pakistan used China as an alternate source for imports. Chinese assistance developed after ZA Bhutto signed a bilateral agreement in May 1976.

The imports network was originally a "Khan network," but not in reference to AQ Khan but to Munir Ahmad Khan, the then head of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, and arguably the true "father" of Pakistan's bomb.

One of the network's key operatives was SA Butt, who was assigned to various Pakistani embassies. The network began operating in earnest in 1976. Having just returned from the Netherlands, Dr AQ Khan played a crucial role in the management of centrifugation technology imports.

Butt managed both uranium-related and plutonium-related imports and remained in charge at least until the late 1980s, claims Tertrias.

Tertrias writes that Pakistan resorted systematically to the use of its embassies abroad, and often to Pakistani-born foreign nationals. It paid more than the market value for items purchased.

As export controls began to be reinforced in the late 1970s, they purchased individual components rather than entire units, and learned how to reproduce the parts.

Besides, classic tricks such as multiple buyers, multiple intermediaries, front companies and false end-user certificates, Pakistan used more imaginative tactics. For instance, it sometimes hid a critical component in a long list of useless material. It also often limited its "shopping lists" to a few samples, in order to learn how to reproduce them.

A 2003 British intelligence report states that no less than 95 Pakistani organisations and government bodies, including diplomatic posts abroad, had assisted in the country's nuclear imports, the analysis said.

Dr AQ Khan was able to bring back a long list of companies and individuals he personally knew, and who could be helpful for Pakistani imports. Dr Salam also helped.

Starting somewhere around mid-1980s, Pakistan began to export its nuclear technology and know-how. The cooperation with Iran started in 1987 but remained limited to used or obsolete equipment.

Zia said no in 1988 to an Iranian request for mastery of the fuel cycle. After Zia's death, the two parties may have envisioned a more complete cooperation, under pressure from General Mirza Aslam Beg, but probably with the knowledge of political authorities.

Dr Khan was certainly encouraged to act in this direction by Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan after Zia's death in August 1988.

Former US official Henry Rowen has said that Beg threatened in January 1990 to transfer military usage nuclear technology should Washington stopped arms sales to Pakistan.

There is evidence that Benazir Bhutto's Government knew about this cooperation. Hashemi Rafsandjani told her in 1989 that the Pakistani military had offered nuclear technology to Iran. The invasion of Kuwait and the Pressler amendment changed the Pakistani perspective.

With North Korea, the relationship was on a quid pro quo basis. Nuclear exports began much later than missile imports. Bhutto is on the record for stating that her 1993 deal involved paying for the missiles in cash.

The reasons behind the Libya transfers remain unclear. Personal greed and perhaps a temptation to give the bomb to a Muslim country that had helped so much Pakistan in the past were in all likelihood the determining factors.

But one has to wonder how it was possible that transfers of nuclear technology to Libya could have taken place after 2001. It seems that Dr Khan was allowed to continue his travels even after he was ousted in March 2001.

Tertrias writes, "Most knowledgeable observers of the Pakistani scene agree that AQ Khan had an important degree of autonomy. If nuclear exports had been a consistent State policy, then it would have been logical that PAEC had a role in it too, which does not seem to have been the case."

Khan likely exceeded whatever mandate he received from the Pakistani leadership. He may have felt that he was 'covered' for whatever he did by the large amount of trust and autonomy he was enticed with. It seems in fact that AQ Khan was able to manipulate the government and the Pakistani authorities did not want to know what was going on. Dr Khan's personal profits were reportedly known by intelligence agencies since 1988, but Pakistan's military authorities refused to act, the analysis said.

In effect, "Pakistani nuclear exports were thus partly a personal initiative, partly a state policy, in various proportions according to the circumstances. Different transfers probably reflected different situations.

The apparent quid pro quo with North Korea may have been a state policy made with knowledge of most high-level Pakistani authorities, including Bhutto and Sharif. The case of Libya was probably an AQ Khan initiative. The offer to Iraq was probably Dr Khan's own initiative. Iran is the most complex case.

Tertrias concluded, "It seems that there was no constant and consistent state policy governing the nuclear exports made, or sanctioned, by Pakistani officials in the past 30 years. Concrete interests, personal and national, seem to have been the primary driver behind these exports.

ANI