A German TV documentary on disgraced nuclear scientist Dr AQ Khan titled The Mullahs Phsyicist claimed that Pakistan had mastered the process of uranium enrichment by mid-1980s, and despite the unstable relationship with Iran, officials from the two states held clandestine talks on nuclear cooperation.
Washington, Aug 21 : A German TV documentary on disgraced nuclear scientist Dr AQ Khan titled "The Mullahs' Phsyicist" claimed that Pakistan had mastered the process of uranium enrichment by mid-1980s, and despite the unstable relationship with Iran, officials from the two states held clandestine talks on nuclear cooperation.
A review of the documentary by Tom Bielefeld and Hassan Abbas published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists said that by 1984, Dr Khan's Kahuta facility had produced enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.
In parallel to the official talks between Iran and Pakistan, members of the Khan network started their own business with Iran.
From 1985, Heinz Mebus, a German engineer and former colleague of Dr Khan at Urenco, negotiated with Iranian officials, apparently on Dr Khan's behalf that the material in their possession constituted a valuable package, and they were willing to sell it, the documentary said.
The film identifies Masud Naraghi as the Iranian individual in charge of these negotiations, the Daily Times reported.
Olli Heinonen, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General and responsible for the agency's investigation into Dr Khan's activities, confirmed Naraghi's role describing him as the "project leader" for Iran's enrichment programme in an interview for the film.
The deal between the two sides was closed in 1987 at a hotel suite in Dubai, in the presence of both Mebus and Naraghi, according to the film.
The Iranians got reliable "specifications and drawings, and manufacturing instructions for the equipment" from the network. They also received a list of companies that could manufacture the parts. According to the film, the Iranians paid 8 million dollars for the package.
Naraghi led the Iranian project to an impasse and lost his responsibilities in 1992. Later that year, he walked into the US Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, and was flown to the US with his family. The Americans did not share the information they gathered from Naraghi with the IAEA.
Instead, the US focussed the Russians and Chinese to cease their nuclear cooperation with Iran.
China is said to have secretly sold uranium ore to Iran in 1991, and it began constructing a conversion plant in Isfahan. It also planned to deliver a reactor to Iran. Here, too, US pressure finally led China to discontinue support for Iran's nuclear activities.
The Iranians went back to the Khan network in 1993 to begin procuring components for about 500 centrifuges of the older P-1 type, as well as designs for the more advanced model P-2 centrifuge. These shipments then gave a boost to Iran's clandestine enrichment programme.
The film concluded that the lack of US cooperation with the IAEA in 1993 was key to Iran's ultimate successes, but this finding requires further study.
ANI