US should guard against Pashtun time bomb in Pakistan, Afghanistan

The influence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pashtun-dominated northwest Pakistan and southern Afghanistan through their messianic brand of Islam could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the breakup of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, Pashtunistan, under radical Islamist leadership, says noted South Asian expert Selig Harrison.

Washington, Aug.2 : The influence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pashtun-dominated northwest Pakistan and southern Afghanistan through their messianic brand of Islam could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the breakup of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, "Pashtunistan," under radical Islamist leadership, says noted South Asian expert Selig Harrison.

According to Harrison, director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy and author of "In Afghanistan's Shadow, both Pakistan and Afghanistan are fragile, multi-ethnic states, and he believes that the United States is inadvertently helping Al Qaeda and the Taliban capture the leadership of Pashtun nationalism.

In an article for the Boston Globe, Harrison further goes on to say that the Pashtun mountain tribes have resisted Punjabi domination for centuries and fiercely guarded their semi-autonomous status.

He believes that Washington's move to pressure Musharraf to bring the autonomous tribal areas under his rule, and its proposal to launch unilateral strikes, could be counter-productive.

Pashtuns being the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan, bitterly resent the disproportionate influence enjoyed by the Tajik ethnic minority in the Karzai regime, a legacy of U.S. collaboration with Tajik militias in overthrowing the Taliban. Pashtunsalso feel that they have been the main victims of U.S.-NATO bombing attacks on the Taliban, who are largely Pashtuns and operate almost entirely in Pashtun territory. In one authoritative estimate, civilian casualties have numbered nearly 5,000 since 2001.

Under pressure from Washington for action against suspected Qaeda sanctuaries, Pakistan launched operations with gun ships and heavy artillery in early 2004 that displaced some 50,000 people, inflicting heavy civilian casualties.

According to Harrison, the International Crisis Group reported "the use of indiscriminate and excessive force alienated the local populace."

To pacify his Pashtun generals, Musharraf later authorized peace agreements with tribal leaders, but Harrison says these pacts have been subverted in many areas by aroused Islamist and Pashtun nationalist groups, and have now broken down completely in the angry aftermath of the assault on the Red Mosque.

"The radicalization of the Pashtun areas has intensified both Islamist zealotry and Pashtun nationalism," he opines.

"In the conventional wisdom, either Islamist or Pashtun identity will triumph, but a more plausible possibility is that the result could be what the former Pakistani diplomat Hussain Haqqani has called an "Islamic Pashtunistan," he adds.

If the U.S. wants to defuse the "Pashtunistan" time bomb, Harrison says that Washington would have to minimize air strikes in both Afghanistan and the FATA, encourage Karzai to put leading Pashtuns from the large Ghilzai tribes into key security posts in Kabul, press for a civilian government in Pakistan that will implement the 1973 constitution, which gives provincial autonomy to the Pashtun, Baluch and Sindhi minorities and offsets Punjabi domination, i.e. creation of a consolidated Pashtun state.

"The FATA could then participate in Pakistani politics and secular Pashtun forces led by the National Awami Party would be strengthened," he opines.

Harrison says that a U.S. move to push through 750 million dollars in aid into FATA is ill advised, as economic aid though desirable, would not be welcomed by the tribes if they knew that it was being channelised through the "hated Punjabi regime".

"Democracy, in short, is the precondition not only for combating the jihadist forces in Pakistan more effectively, but also for the long-term survival of multiethnic Pakistan in its present form," Harrison concludes.

ANI