The Research and Analysis Wing was nver raw (article)

)There has been a great deal of discussion in the media about the effectiveness of our intelligence organizations following the blasts in Hyderabad during the last week of August, which killed 41 persons and injured over 60.

By I. Ramamohan Rao

New Delhi: September 3, There has been a great deal of discussion in the media about the effectiveness of our intelligence organizations following the blasts in Hyderabad during the last week of August, which killed 41 persons and injured over 60.

The blasts have followed similar explosions at the Mecca Masjid, also in Hyderabad in May. More intriguing has been the report that the Central Home Ministry knew that there was a distinct possibility of bomb attacks somewhere in the southern states of the country, but had no clue as to where and when it would happen.

There have been reports that the blasts have been engineered by the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan and the Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami which has its base in Bangladesh. A little over a year ago there were serial bomb blasts in Mumbai Metro Railways.

These tragic incidents have been taking place at regular intervals, in spite of the fact that the Indian Intelligence Bureau, which has been ranked the fourth among all intelligence agencies of the world, has been keeping the Government informed of the dangers facing the country. . The Research and Analysis Wing, (R and AW) responsible for collecting intelligence from outside the country, has enjoyed the reputation as one of the best in the region.

What are our weaknesses? There has been little informed discussion about the intelligence organizations in the country. When something goes wrong, like in Kargil in 1999, the intelligence agencies are blamed. Something similar happened in Sri Lanka in 1987 when the Government decided to send the Indian Peacekeeping Force on tasks which were not clear.

One should, therefore, welcome the recent book "The KAO Boys of the R and AW" by B. Raman, one of the country's outstanding strategic analysts, who was with the organization for 26 years. He has documented the achievements of the R and AW, as well as its 'failures' and has given his own assessment of the organisation.

While the country became independent, we had only one intelligence agency whose domain was all-pervasive. The Army, Navy and the Air Force had their intelligence set ups, but they were recipients of inputs from the Intelligence Bureau. The Research and Analysis Wing was created in 1968.

Following the Kargil War, a Defence Intelligence Organisation and a National Technical Research Organisation have been created. Para-military forces have also spruced up their own intelligence set ups. Some States also have their intelligence units. The different organizations have their own chain of command and are reluctant to share the information collected by them, except in exceptional circumstances.

There are suggestions that India needs a Federal Intelligence Agency on the pattern of the FBI of the United States, but would this be possible, given that states of the country have different political parties holding office, and most are reluctant to permit a Central Agency to look over their shoulders. Law and order being a State subject, the Centre will have difficulty in creating a Federal Intelligence Agency or creating a force which can 'act' against terrorist forces across the country.

The job of coordination is presently done by the National Security Advisor, who has a full time-job which includes strategic policy making. B. Raman says it is time to think in terms of a National Intelligence Advisor, directly answerable to the Prime Minister.

Raman's book could not have come at a better time. Raman himself was the head of the counter-terrorism wing of the R and AW, between 1988 and 1994 and narrowly missed being the head of the agency.

An original KAOBOY, as he calls officers who were recruited by the first head of the Research Wing, Rameshwar Nath Kao, when the agency was created, he has had the opportunity of being closely involved with many events and observing others during his tenure with the organization.

His first assignment in the agency was to keep an eye on developments in Burma. In that capacity, he collected information about the support given by China to Naga hostiles including giving them weapons and military training in remote areas of Burma. The Chinese efforts to promote insurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram, in association with Pakistan, came to an end only after the liberation of Bangladesh.

The Research and Analysis Wing came into limelight for the role it played during the liberation of Bangladesh. The organization had set up a psychological warfare unit, which created awareness both in East Pakistan and all over the world about the misdeeds of the Pakistan Army in the East.

As Raman says, the successful completion of the liberation of Bangladesh was the result of the struggle of people of then East Pakistan, supported by the Indian Army. It was also the R and AWs 'finest hour', and dozens of officers of the organization contributed to its 'brilliant performance under the leadership of Kao and K. Sankaran Nair, his No. 2. As Public Relations Officer of the Army in Delhi, I had the advantage of observing Kao in the office of General SHFJ Manekshaw, during those critical days.

The expansion of the agency, and the setting up of new offices within the country, gave it a larger than life image. It was rumored that the organization was 'spying' on political rivals of Indira Gandhi. When Indira Gandhi lost power after the elections in 1977, Morarji Desai cut down some units, particularly the Information and the Political Divisions. Raman points out that there have been efforts to revive the Information Division, but the adhoc steps have never been able to restore the vision that Kao had.

The Research and Analysis Wing has also had many critics within the bureaucracy. As Raman points out, when they are posted in Embassies abroad, they are given cover assignments. The officers' report directly to their desks at the Headquarters in Delhi, and this has invited criticism that the R and AW has been trying to function as a parallel Foreign Ministry.

The Agency played an important role in countering the Khalistan agitation, which had received ample support from Pakistan, and even from organizations in the United States. The restrictions imposed on persons arriving in Delhi during the Asian Games and the Non-Aligned summit in 1983 angered Sikhs in Punjab, which provided fuel to the agitation.

The 'Khalistanis', in coordination with the ISI, successfully hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft, which gave a boost to the controversy. Raman reveals how the agency managed to arrest the hijackers on August 24, 1984 in the UAE with the assistance of Romesh Bhandari, then Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, which put an end to such attempts.

Raman discloses that the Agency representative had detailed discussions with those holed up in the Akal Takht as suggested by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, to find a solution to the situation in the Golden Temple Amritsar. The Akal Takht was occupied by late Sant Bhindranwale, who had fortified the place, which was adjacent to the temple.

The Army was asked to clear the Akal Takht, causing the least damage to the structure. . Raman says that General Sunderji was overconfident during the Blue Star operations. He displayed similar overconfidence during the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka, by assuring Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE could be controlled within a month, a task which the Indian Army could not accomplish for many months.

Raman has detailed the after-effects of Blue Star operations. Kao, who had retired as the head of the R and AW and was Advisor to Indira Gandhi, was away in China on that fateful day when she was shot by her own bodyguards. The assassination of Indira Gandhi, he says, is a 'dark chapter' in the history of the Indian intelligence and security establishment. He says: "She depended on us to protect her. We failed her."

Raman has also given instances when foreign intelligence agencies were able to penetrate the R and AW and the Prime Minister's Office. The defection of Raminder Singh, after he was found, sending information to the CIA is a recent incident.

Earlier, during Rajiv Gandhi's Prime Ministership, Raman discloses, the CIA was able to get from the French external intelligence agency - which had penetrated the office of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister -- copies of all reports on Sri Lanka being sent to the PMO by the IB and the R and AW.

Raman's book is candid in many respects. He says the R and AW has only partly fulfilled the purposes for which it was set up by Indira Gandhi and Kao. It is strong in its capability for covert action, weak in its capability for intelligence collection, analysis and assessment. One of its strong points is TECHINT, or technical intelligence. One recalls how it was able to intercept the conversation that General Musharraf, who was on a visit to China, had with his Chief of Staff in Rawalpindi, in 1999.

Among the many suggestions that Raman has made is that the R and AW should be ready to accept external auditing of its management and performance which could identify and eliminate inadequacies and bad practices.

The overall impression that one gets after going through Raman's ' memory lane' is that R and AW was a mature organization right from the beginning not at any time raw.

I. Ramamohan Rao, former Principal Information Officer, Government of India.

e-mail: raoramamohan@hotmail.com

ANI